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Abstract
This article discusses the role of China, Russia, India and Brazil in the climate regime. 
It describes the trajectory of their emissions, of their domestic policies and of their 
international commitments, and argues that, despite their responsibility in causing the 
problem, they have been conservative forces in the climate regime.
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Introduction
Climate change is the greatest challenge of current inter national affairs. The rising concentration of 
Greenhouse Gases (GHG) – especially carbon dioxide (CO2) 
– in the atmosphere is causing irreversible changes in climate 
patterns: extreme weather events are becoming more frequent, 
and average global temperature is expected to increase between 
3.5 and 4oC by 2100 if current trajectories of emissions continue. 
Climate change implies severe impacts on living conditions. 
Global decarbonization – decreasing GHG emissions so that their 
concentration in the atmosphere can be stabilized, ideally reduced 
– is of utmost need to mitigate it. At the Paris Conference (2015), 
countries presented commitments that, if fully implemented, will 
limit average temperature increase around 2.7oC in the long run. 
Achieving global decarbonization requires a lot more.
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China, India, Russia and Brazil, the BRIC countries object of this article, are among the 
greatest global GHG emitters. They are, together with the United States, the European Union, 
Japan and Korea, key climate powers – countries that answer for a relevant share of GHG 
emissions in total global amount, and have human and technological capacity to implement 
decarbonization. Since 1992, when the climate regime was inaugurated, the BRIC countries’ 
emissions have been increasing consistently, contributing to the accumulated amount of GHG 
in the atmosphere. Yet, it is not clear whether climate change has occupied a central locus in 
these countries’ policy making.
It is the objective of this paper to contribute to this debate by offering an analysis of the 
decarbonization in the BRIC countries. The article is divided in three parts. First, the profile 
of the countries’ emissions is drawn, in order to identify which are their main emitting sectors. 
Second, due to the weight of energy supply in global GHG emissions, the existence of energy 
related climate change mitigation policy is checked, as well as its directions concerning low 
carbon energy sources and energy efficiency. Third, the trajectories of the BRIC countries in 
the climate regime, to date, are outlined. The analysis will show the reason for which these 
countries are classified as conservative powers in the climate regime and why it is unlikely that 
their conservative status will change in the near future.
Four different GHG emission profiles
China, the most populated country in the world and the second world economy, is a key 
player in the climate regime. China is a climate heavyweight and an energy super-consumer. 
Its positions in the climate regime and its choices regarding both energy production and energy 
imports – it is the world’s largest energy importer – impact global decarbonization deeply. 
Between 1990 and 2012, Chinese GHG emissions increased more than 230%, and, in the same 
period, Chinese share in global emissions increased from 9.48% to 22.44%. In China, emissions 
including and excluding Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) increase in tandem, 
meaning that the main sources of GHG emissions in the country are other than LULUCF. 
In fact, the energy sector is the greatest GHG emitter in China: it was responsible for 19.98% 
of total global GHG emissions in 2012 (WRI 2015a). Chinese energy-related emissions rose 
246.53% between 1990 and 2012 (WRI 2015b). Chinese emissions from other sectors are also 
relevant in the global aggregate, but do not compare to the ones from energy: industry answered 
for 3% of global GHG emissions in 2012 (WRI 2015a) and increased 1,031.65% between 1990 
and 2012 (WRI 2015b); agriculture answered for 1.92% of global GHG emissions in 2012 
(WRI 2015a) and increased 53.23% in the same period (WRI 2015b).
Russia is a climate great weight and a super-exporter of fossil fuels, especially natural gas. 
It will be a great looser in a carbon-constrained world: its revenues from exporting fossil fuels 
will decrease if renewable energy becomes preferred in the global energy market. Russia is a 
deviant case among the four countries because its emissions decreased more than 18% between 
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1990 and 2012 and its share in global emissions halved in the same period – from 8.18% to 
4.73%. The difference between emissions including and excluding LULUCF is also not relevant.1 
Energy is the great driver of Russian GHG emissions, having answered for 4.82% of global 
GHG emissions in 2012 (WRI 2015a). These emissions decreased 30.75% between 1990 and 
2012 (WRI 2015c), though. Agriculture, industry and waste in Russia answered, together, for 
0.54% of total world GHG emissions in 2012 (WRI 2015a).
India is the second most populated country in the world and an economy that grows much 
faster than Russia and Brazil – and, since 2015, faster than China. India is a climate great 
weight gravitating towards becoming a heavyweight due to its absolute emissions, although 
there is an enormous gap between those and Indian’s per capita emissions, which still is very 
low. India is an energy super-importer. Indian emissions increased 140.18% between 1990 
and 2012, and their share in global emissions almost doubled in that period. Energy is a key 
driver: it produced 4.91% of global emissions in 2012 (WRI 2015a), having increased 210.26% 
between 1990 and 2012 (WRI 2015d). Emissions from agriculture are also relevant in India: 
they increased 31.08% between 1990 and 2012 (WRI 2015d) and were responsible for 1.52% 
of global GHG emissions in 2012 (WRI 2015a). Emissions from industrial processes and waste 
also rose substantially between 1990 and 2012, but, together, they accounted for only 0.53% 
of total world GHG emissions in 2012 (WRI 2015a).
Brazil is also a climate great weight, but Brazilian GHG emissions have different features. 
First, emissions including LULUCF are greater than emissions excluding it (see table 03 below). 
Second, Brazil has successfully tackled its LULUCF’s emissions between 1990 and 2012, but 
emissions from other sectors have increased in the same period – while Brazilian emissions, 
including LULUCF, increased 13.48% between 1990 and 2012, the share jumps to 79.18% when 
LULUCF is excluded. Emissions from Brazilian energy and agriculture sectors are also relevant: 
the first increased 120.65% between 1990 and 2012 (WRI 2015e) and answered for 1.09% of 
global emissions in 2012 (WRI 2015a); the latter rose 46.60% between 1990 and 2012 (WRI 
2015e) and were responsible for 1.03% of global GHG emissions in 2012 (WRI 2015a). Industry 
and waste answered, together, for 0.22% of total world GHG emissions in 2012 (WRI 2015a).


























China 3,218.45 3,320.97 9.48% 10,684.29 10,975.50 22.44% 231.97% 230.49%
Russia 2,776.78 2,776.78 8.18% 2,254.47 2,322.22 4.73% -18.81% -16.37%
India 1,212.02 1,239.06 3.57% 2,887.08 3,013.77 6.06% 140.18% 143.23%
Brazil 1,606.59 565.09 4.73% 1,823.15 1,012.55 3.83% 13.48% 79.18%
World 33,937.21 30,423.75 47,598.55 44,815.54 40.25% 47.30%
Source: Authors’ own elaboration, based on data from World Resources Institute, CAIT – Climate Data Explorer (database). <http://cait.wri.org/>. 
Accessed December 15, 2015.
1 There is intensive deforestation, due to logging and mining. Deforestation is compensated by reforestation, though.
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Table 2: Total GHG emissions, excluding and including LULUCF (Mt CO2e)
  1990 2000 2010 2012 Variation 1990-2012 (%)
China no LULUCF 3,320.97 4,701.65 9,764.68 10,975.50 230.49%
China with LULUCF 3,218.45 4,371.05 9,473.05 10,684.29 231.97%
Russia no LULUCF 2,776.78 2,060.02 2,230.03 2,322.22 -16.37%
Russia with LULUCF 2,776.78 2,263.53 2,090.23 2,254.47 -18.81%
India no LULUCF 1,239.06 1,767.28 2,772.48 3,013.77 143.23%
India with LULUCF 1,212.02 1,720.19 2,647.93 2,887.08 138.20%
Brazil no LULUCF 565.09 733.48 950.31 1,012.55 79.18%
Brazil with LULUCF 1,606.59 1,778.98 1,773.77 1,823.15 13.48%
Source: Authors’ own elaboration, based on data from World Resources Institute. <http://cait2.wri.org/wri/>. Accessed December 15, 2015.
Despite four different emission profiles, energy-related emissions are increasingly relevant in 
the four BRIC countries. Considering that reducing energy-related emissions is key to mitigate 
climate change, the next section focuses each country’s policies and politics regarding energy 
decarbonization. It assesses: (i) their policy framework towards climate change mitigation and 
its directions for energy; (ii) low carbon energy trends and policies; and (iii) energy efficiency 
trends and policies.
Energy decarbonization evolution in the BRIC countries
China
China has a carbon intensive energy matrix. It is world’s largest energy consumer with 
21.8% of global Total Primary Energy Supply, TPES, in 2012 (IEA 2014a). China is the largest 
producer (45.5% of the global production in 2013) and importer of coal (IEA 2014a), using most 
of it to generate electricity – 76% of its electricity is produced by coal (IEA 2014a). It is also 
the largest producer of hydropower (23.2% of the global production in 2012) and has world’s 
largest hydropower installed capacity, 194GW (IEA 2014a). It is world’s fourth producer (2013 
data) and the world’s second importer (2012 data) of oil (IEA 2014a). The Chinese economy 
is energy intensive – 202.1kg of oil equivalent per USD 1,000 GDP in 2011 (constant 2011 
PPP) –, although per capita levels (2,029kT of oil equivalent in the same year) are low when 
compared to OECD countries (World Bank 2013). China has been investing heavily in wind 
and solar power. It also has 26 first and second-generation nuclear reactors in service, and more 
than 20 third-generation under construction – simultaneously.
The carbon and energy intensiveness of the Chinese economy is related to the country’s 
chosen development path. Until the 1960s, China was an agrarian economy. When industrialization 
was started, it first focused on heavy industry, following the soviet model, but production was 
ineffective. In the late 1970s, several major reforms were undertaken to allow decentralization 
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and improve bureaucracy, and light manufacturing came to the fore. From 1978 to 2001, the 
rapid growth of labor-intensive light manufacturing enabled the country to acquire some energy 
efficient technology and integrate it to its capital stock, but in 2001 this trend was reversed 
due to the spread of energy intensive heavy industry, leading to increased energy demand and 
energy intensity of the Chinese GDP (Rosen and Houser 2007, 9). In fact, between 1978 
and 2000, energy demand grew at an annual rate of 4%; it peaked 13% in 2001; since 2006, 
numbers have started to decrease gradually (Rosen and Houser 2007, 4), but still are among 
the highest in the world.
Recent energy-related emissions are connected to expanding energy and transport services, 
both closely linked to urbanization. The share of urban population changed from 48% of the 
total in 2009 to 53% in 2013 (World Bank 2013). The carbon intensity of Chinese energy 
supply is related to the extensive use of fossil fuels in the country. Therefore, even if China 
successfully redirects its industrial activity away from energy-intensive sectors, the demands 
for heating, cooling, lighting and transportation will keep pressing energy-related emissions.
The 11th Five Year Guidelines (FYG) (2006-2010)2 was aimed at achieving a so-called 
Harmonious Socialist Society through a development path that “takes into consideration [...] 
environmental concerns” (Fan 2006, 709). It targeted a 20% reduction (from the 2005 levels) 
in the Chinese GDP’s energy intensity, energy conservation and emission reductions for each 
Chinese region, sector and individual business, as well as increasing the share of non fossil sources 
in the energy matrix to 10% by 2010 and 15% by 2020 (with specific targets for expanding 
the installed capacity of each renewable source: 300GW for hydro, 30GW for wind, 1.8GW 
for solar photovoltaic and 30GW for biomass-based sources). In the context of the 11th FYG, 
China launched, in 2007, both its National Climate Change Program and its first White Paper 
on Energy Conditions and Policies (measures regarding energy efficiency, energy conservation 
and renewable energy). A economic stimulus package followed, in 2008, and allocated 35% 
of USD 850 billion to low carbon development.3 Following it, several policies were enacted. 
Regarding energy efficiency and energy conservation: the Energy Conservation Law was revised; 
benchmarking in key sectors, such as construction and transportation, was established, as 
well as the Top-1000 Enterprises Energy Conservation Program; energy pricing was coupled 
with energy efficiency – higher energy costs for businesses that did not meet energy efficiency 
standards, and financial rewards for the ones that saved energy –; public transport, alternative 
fuels, combined heat-and-power, surplus heat utilization, green lighting, high performance 
appliances and energy saving buildings were envisaged. Regarding energy production from 
2  The pivotal piece of China’s development planning is the Five Year Plan (FYP). Enacted every five years since 1953, it 
establishes the guidelines for the economic development of the period, according to the priorities set by the Communist 
Party of China. In 1978, FYP became more technical: laws and regulations are developed within its framework, in order 
for the broad objectives of the FYP to be translated into policy. After the 10th FYP, the plans were nominated Five Year 
Guidelines (FYG).
3  It was the second largest low carbon stimulus package in the world, after South Korea’s (65%); developed countries 
allocated around 20% of resources to the same purpose (United States, France, Germany and United Kingdom); Brazil, 
India and Russia, allocated none (Viola et al. 2012).
Wandering decarbonization: the BRIC countries as conservative climate powers
Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 59(1): e001, 2016 Viola; Basso  
6
low carbon sources: the Medium and Long-term Development Plan for Renewable Energy was 
approved; higher taxes on oil, coal and natural gas were authorized; operators of power grids 
were required to buy energy from renewable energy producers; feed-in tariffs, discounted lending 
and the creation of a national fund to foster renewable energy development were established; 
guidelines for renewable energy industries – setting technical standards for renewable energy 
electrical power, technology, and products – were published; rules designed to encourage the 
construction of renewable power generation facilities, efficient buildings, and rural electrification 
were designed (IEA 2014b). Financial support for Research and Development (R&D) on key 
renewable energy technologies, and provincial and local regulation on the same issues followed 
(Held et al. 2011, 29-31). It was also noted that the Chinese central government and several 
local governments from the coastal region engaged in diplomatic talks and offered economic 
incentives to attract investments from Taiwanese companies leaders in low carbon technology.
Achievements of the 11th FYG were substantial, but very heterogeneously distributed 
along the country and were not enough to reduce Chinese energy’s carbon intensiveness. 
In energy efficiency, the greatest failure was the lack of compliance of coal thermal power plants 
with the 20% increase in efficiency standards. However, there were important advances:4 China 
closed most obsolete power, iron and steel plants; it employed energy-efficient technologies 
and materials in heating. China also improved fuels and made massive investments in transit 
systems – even though the expansion of automotive production is resulting in large and long 
traffic congestions in major Chinese metropolitan areas. There were significant achievements 
regarding renewable energy as well: China is currently the world’s largest producer and consumer 
of renewable energy, but in both cases in absolute numbers, not in per capita or per unit of 
GDP. It became the largest market for wind turbines, and it is world’s largest manufacturer of 
solar photovoltaic panels. Yet the share of low carbon energy of its matrix is only 4% (Reegle 
2013a; World Bank 2013).
The 12th FYG (2011-2015) targets decreasing Chinese energy intensity by 16%, and 
Chinese carbon intensity by 17%, from the 2005 levels; non-fossil energy sources should produce 
11.4% of Chinese TPES by 2015 and 15% by 2020. The country is planning to expand both 
low carbon energy sources installed capacity – 40GW from nuclear, 70GW from wind, 5GW 
from solar and 120GW from hydropower – and power grid (smart grid national standards are 
being developed). Between 2013 and 2014, China enacted an impressive amount of regulation 
to further promote renewable energy: incentives to stimulate purchasing of vehicles fueled 
with renewable energy; bonus for renewable energy electricity generation; financial measures in 
support of solar photovoltaic technology; feed-in tariffs; procedures for managing of distributed 
power grid; promoting technology by price leverage effect; strengthening product testing and 
certification; price policy on offshore wind power electricity generation; promotion of geothermal 
4  In a period when GDP increased 10% annually, a reduction of 14.4% (Economy 2010, 4) or 18% (Held et al. 2011, 32-33) in energy 
intensity is substantial. Economy stresses that the target was missed because the 2008-2010 fiscal stimulus package encouraged 
enormous investment in heavy industry and infrastructure, both energy intensive sectors.
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energy (IEA 2014b). Further investments are planned for public transportation. The plan also 
benefits seven “strategic emerging industries” with tax exemptions and beneficial procurement 
policies, among which new energy, energy conservation and clean energy vehicles.
It is early to evaluate the results of the 12th FYG, but new records of pollution in major 
cities are a clear indication of constraints in implementation. The NIMBY (“not-in-my-backyard”) 
movement is pressing in favor of renewables: in 2013, grassroots’ pressures resulted in the closure 
of a copper refinery, which is very polluting, and a plutonium processing plant. If sustained in 
time and fully implemented, the recent trend regarding low carbon energy might benefit global 
climate change mitigation. It is even possible that Chinese emissions will peak before 2030, 
but this depends on a transition to a service/consumer-oriented economy.
Russia
Russia is the second largest producer of oil (12.8% of world’s total in 2013), the second 
largest producer of natural gas (19.3% of world’s total in 2013) and the fourth producer of 
electricity (1069TWh in 2012) (IEA 2014a). It is a major energy exporter: the largest exporter 
of gas (203bcm in 2013), the second largest of oil (239MT in 2012) and the third largest of coal 
(114MT in 2013) (IEA 2014a). Although a share of Russian electricity comes from low carbon 
sources (hydropower and nuclear answer for 11.7%), fossil fuels provide 67.5% (or 722TWh 
out of a total 1069TWh) of it – 525TWh are provided by natural gas (IEA 2014a). Russian 
economy is energy intensive: 226.5kg of oil equivalent per USD 1,000 GDP in 2011 (constant 
2011 PPP). In spite of the fact that Russia has one of the largest potential for renewable energy 
in the world, almost no effort to develop it has been undertaken since 1990.
Due to the fact of being a great exporter of fossil fuels, Russian energy is not only a means 
to development and a necessity to Russian population wellbeing, but it is a national business 
with global proportions – including massive corruption. This is very significant, and many of 
the incoherencies of Russian energy decarbonization policies can be better understood when 
this is kept in mind.
In 1990, Russia was still part of the ex-USSR, which deemed issues such as energy efficiency 
or cost-effective energy production and consumption as secondary. This legacy persists in Russia; 
only small-scale changes have taken place. The reduction in emissions and energy use that took 
place between 1990 and 2013 were not due to increasing energy efficiency and or to low carbon 
energy sources, but to decreasing economic activity. In 1990, the ex-USSR consumed 60.914 
quadrillion BTU (EIA 2014); in 1992, after the end of the USSR, Russia’s energy consumption 
was 34.116 quadrillion BTU (EIA 2014); in 2010, it was 29.999 quadrillion BTU (EIA 2014). 
The country has an enormous potential for improving energy efficiency, but related policy-making 
and implementation is only at its infancy.
Since 2005, Russian federal government has addressed several issues related to energy 
efficiency, among them are parameters for buildings, standards for energy efficiency audits, 
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a thermal performance code, energy efficiency labeling and deployment of energy meters; the 
Energy Conservation and Energy Efficiency Increase Law (Federal Law No. 261-FZ) was enacted 
in 2009.5 In the same year, the country launched its guidelines for promoting renewable energy, 
targeting the increase of renewable sources in electricity generation – 1.5% in 2010, 2.5% 
in 2015 and 4.5% in 2020 (IEA 2014c) – and the Climate Doctrine of Russia – a statement 
that recognizes the danger of climate change, the anthropogenic influence to cause it, and the 
importance of enhancing energy efficiency and expanding renewable energy in Russia (IEA 2014c; 
Russia 2009a). More recently, the Decree on the mechanism for the promotion of renewable 
energy on the wholesale electricity and market – which established incentive mechanisms for the 
generation of energy from wind, solar photovoltaic and small hydropower plants (IEA 2014c) –, 
enacted in 2013, and the Russia Energy Strategy to 2030 – which highlights the importance of 
the energy sector to the Russian economy and the necessary changes, mainly modernization 
of structures and markets, it has to undergo in order to remain competitive in the future – 
enacted in 2003 and amended in 2009 (IEA 2014c; Russia 2009b) are key policy advances.
Yet, results are timid. Russian’s energy intensity is still two times higher than the average 
International Energy Agency member levels – and has slightly increased in the last years –, 
and its carbon intensity is 60% higher (IEA 2014d). To modify this picture, Russia needs to 
undergo massive change: (i) reforms in infrastructure – to end regulated tariffs, subsidies and 
cross-subsidies, to liberalize retail electricity and gas tariffs, to implement consumption-based 
billing and metering systems, to expand and enforce the quality of service requirements –; 
(ii) implementation of the regulation that has been created – focusing on co-ordination among 
Ministries, sub-national laws and regulatory acts –; (iii) more efficient markets –encouraging 
transparency and competition in oil and gas sectors, and completing the liberalization of electricity 
markets –; (iv) development of more cost-efficient oil and gas resources and adjustment of export 
strategies – in order to maintain production in high levels, tax reforms (adoption of a profit-based 
taxation), regulation of joint ventures (to reduce risks for foreign partners), expanding use of gas 
in transportation and building new pipelines (IEA 2014d); and, very importantlt, (v) to increase 
consistently the rule of law. Unfortunately the dynamic of Russia in the last Putin administration 
(started in 2013) is going in the opposite direction, particularly since the annexation of Crimea 
and the military intervention in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. Dependent on fossil fuel exports to 
balance its budget, Russia has been severely affected by the sharp fall of international oil prices 
(since mid 2014). The country has been trying to get around the lost in revenues by increasing 
its oil production, and concerns over climate change have been left out of the agenda.
5   According to IEA, adding to the ones in the text: Microclimate Parameters in Buildings (2000), Standards for Energy Efficiency 
Audits (2003), Thermal performance Code (2003), Energy Performance Contracts (2009), Energy Audits and Energy Passports 
(2010), Deployment of Energy Meters (2011), Energy Efficiency Labeling (2011), Decree on Measures to Ensure Affordable and 
Comfortable Accommodation and Quality of Housing and Communal Services (2012). <http://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/
energyefficiency/?country=Russian%20Federation>.
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India
India is the world’s third largest producer (613MT in 2013) and importer (178MT in 
2013) of coal and the third largest importer (185MT in 2012) of oil (IEA 2014a). It is the third 
largest producer of electricity (1128TWh in 2012), and 71% of it comes from coal – hydropower 
generated 126TWh in 2012 (IEA 2014a). It is also an energy intensive economy: 125.7kg of oil 
equivalent per USD1,000 GDP in 2011 (constant 2011 PPP). Per capita energy consumption, 
however, is low: while the world average (TPES/capita, ton of oil equivalent) is 1.90 and OECD’s 
is 4.19, India’s is 0.64; the world average electricity consumption per capita is 2,972 KWh/
capita, OECD’s is 8,089 and India’s is 760. The country faces important infrastructure issues 
in energy services: approximately 25% of the population has no access to electricity, and 625 
million people depend on biomass (wood mainly) for cooking (Reegle 2013b; World Bank 2013).
India is a large importer of energy, and energy imports have been increasing lately. This 
means that India is very sensitive to changes in global energy markets and also that it could benefit 
greatly from further development of low carbon sources. In fact, low carbon energy sources are 
extremely relevant in reducing Indian energy access gap and increasing its energy security. This 
goes not unseen in India: in fact, the country has a massive amount of plans oriented to increase 
the share of renewables in its energy matrix. The greatest stumbling block for it’s implementation 
is the very fragmented political system and important vested interests in exploiting Indian’s vast 
coal reserves.
India enacts a central piece of policy planning every five years, also called Five Year Plan 
(FYP). Energy access, energy security and energy efficiency are usually part of it. In the 10th FYP, 
increasing the production of coal and electricity, accelerating the exploration of hydrocarbons, 
restructuring the energy sector (deregulating) to increase efficiency, and introducing energy 
efficiency standards for processes and appliances were planned (India 2002, 759). Climate 
change was part of the 11th FYP, in a chapter specifically called Environment and Climate 
Change. In this chapter, climate change was acknowledged as “one of the most serious concerns 
of our time”, and the impacts and risks for the country were highlighted (India 2007, 203). 
As a response to the challenge, the FYP targets reducing energy intensity of Indian economy 
by 20% until 2017 (compared to the 2007-08 levels) and increasing energy production from 
renewables (India 2007, 205-207). When addressing the energy sector specifically, however, the 
plan reinforces the conclusions of the Integrated Energy Policy Report: renewables are likely 
to account for only around 5-6% of the primary commercial energy needs by 2032, and coal 
production will increase 150% by 2012, compared to the 2006-2007 levels (India 2007, 347).
The Indian National Action Plan on Climate Change was enacted in 2008. It is an extent 
policy framework that identifies several issues related to climate change mitigation and adaptation, 
and establishes eight core national missions, among them: a solar mission, directed to increase 
thermal and photovoltaic solar energy generation in at least 1000MW until 2017; an energy 
efficiency mission, to achieve energy savings of at least 10000MW by 2012; and a sustainable habitat 
mission, to include energy efficiency as a core component of building regulation (India 2008). 
Wandering decarbonization: the BRIC countries as conservative climate powers
Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 59(1): e001, 2016 Viola; Basso  
10
In the context of the plan, several regulatory pieces were enacted, including a 2009-2010 
renewable energy regulation that creates feed-in tariffs in order to incentivize a large development 
of these energy sources in the country.
In the current 12th FYP (2012-2017), climate change is no longer a central topic: it is 
treated as one of the issues to be tackled in order to achieve sustainable development, mainly 
through eco-efficiency and low carbon strategy for inclusive growth (India 2013, 113-117). 
As for energy, the plan maintains that Indian dependency on energy imports is a major issue, 
and that the importance of expanding energy access and energy security leads to increasing 
coal, oil and gas production country. Nevertheless, the plan states that renewable energy must 
be emphasized, and that expected increases of 30MW in renewables supply until 2017 and of 
75MW until 2022, both from 2012 levels, are reasonable (India 2013, 132-135).
It is hard, though, to expect significant change regarding energy efficiency and renewable 
energy in India in the next one-to-two decades. Despite the impressive amount of policy directed 
to the issues6 and gains from addressing the topics, there are conflicting interests that make any 
effort in the direction of implementing these objectives unlikely to be straightforward. To name 
a few: (i) the country’s vast coal reserves, which exploitation is seen as best policy advice, given 
concerns over energy security and the need of fast enhancement of energy access; (ii) the fall 
in the international price of oil, which has increased Indian oil consumption beyond previous 
expectations, strengthening GDP growth and carbon emissions in 2015; (iii) the profound 
fragmentation of Indian political system, which makes it very hard for both enacting coherent 
national policy and implementing them uniformly across the country; (iv) deep-rooted 
anti-colonization feelings and a victim attitude, leading to dismissing important mitigation 
action or blaming industrialized countries for the problem – in fact, it creates a bizarre situation 
in which India is one of the most vulnerable countries to the effects of climate change but 
one of the least willing to take consistent positive action towards mitigation; the fact that per 
capita numbers, and never absolute ones, are quoted by the country in every policy piece and 
international position is a clear sign of it –; and (v) the situation of extreme poverty in which 
a considerable share of Indian population live – it is very hard to establish policy objectives 
that will have an enormous positive impact in the long run, yet require massive investments 
and behavior change (such as payment for electricity) in the short run, considering that many 
people have no access to minimum education, sanitation, food and health systems, and a still 
predominant culture which separates groups in immutable casts in the vastly populated rural.
6  Some examples: Energy Conservation Act (2001, amended in 2010), which establishes energy consumption norms, buildings to respect 
energy efficiency standards and energy efficiency labels to be added to appliances; Electricity Act (2003), which consolidates law relating 
to generation, transmission, distribution and trading of electricity; the Integrated Energy Policy (2006), which establishes targets of 
20% reduction in energy intensity and 34% increase in efficiency of power generation – but recognizes that coal is likely to remain 
the major energy source in India; Tariff Policy (2006), which creates preferential tariffs to non-conventional energy technologies; 
Pre-payment in Electricity Metering (2007), an ambitious policy piece that establishes single-phase and three-phase electricity loads 
below 45KW to discourage power usage and ensure payment of bills; Ethanol Policy (2007), with incentives to the biofuel chain 
production – such as subsidies to freight from sugar mills to export points, payment of a minimum price per liter of ethanol and a 
compulsory target of 10% of ethanol to be added in petrol by 2008; and the Renewable Energy Tariff Regulation (2009-10), which 
establishes feed-in tariffs to renewable energy, so to increase their share in the energy matrix (IEA, 2014e).
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Brazil
Compared to China, Russia and India, Brazil has much more modest energy numbers. 
It is not among the greatest oil, coal or natural gas producers or consumers; it produces 11.1% 
of the world’s total world hydroelectricity (in 2012), 75.2% of its electricity comes from hydro 
(2012) and has the third largest hydropower installed capacity (84GW in 2012) (IEA 2014a). 
Brazil has a relatively low carbon energy matrix: in 2012, 46% of its total primary energy 
production and 42.4% of its total primary energy supply came from low-carbon sources (EPE 
2013, 21-22). Brazil does not have an energy intensive economy – 95.9kg of oil equivalent per 
USD1,000 GDP in 2011 (constant 2011 PPP). Brazil is broadly self-sufficient in energy, and 
is has vanguard technology for exploring deep offshore oil reserves, hydropower technology 
(especially in designing reservoirs) and in producing electricity and fuel (ethanol) from sugar cane.
LULUCF, especially deforestation, have traditionally driven Brazilian GHG emissions. 
In the second half of the 2000s, deforestation in the Amazon was finally tackled, and rates 
decreased from 27,000 km2 a year in 2004 to 7,500 km2 a year in 2009 (INPE 2015). They 
continued to drop until 2012, and stabilized at around 5,000 km2 a year since then (INPE 2015; 
Viola and Basso 2014) – which still are very high levels, showing policy setbacks in dealing 
with the issue. Around 80% of it is illegal deforestation. On the other hand, there has not been 
any progress in tackling deforestation in the Cerrado savannah, the current great agricultural 
frontier of Brazil. Deforestation is still of large concern in Brazil; yet, currently, agriculture and 
energy share with it the position of main drivers of Brazilian emissions.
The Brazilian National Climate Change Plan was enacted in 2008. The Plan established 
targets in several areas so to mitigate climate change, among which are initiatives in the energy 
sector: to stimulate efficiency in all economic sectors (especially: energy efficiency; substitute 
coal with charcoal coming from planted forests; replace old fridges and HCFCs; invest in solar 
water heating and urban waste recycling; phasing out the use of fire for clearing sugar cane 
plantations; integrate agriculture and cattle raising systems); to maintain the share of renewable 
energy in the Brazilian electricity matrix; to encourage the domestic and international use of 
biofuels; to seek further reduction of deforestation; to eliminate the net loss of forest coverage; 
to strengthen inter-sector actions as to reduce climate change vulnerability; and to identify the 
impacts of climate change in the environment and support scientific research about it (Brazil 
2008). In 2009, the Plan was integrated into the National Climate Change Policy (Law No. 12187, 
complemented by Decree No. 7390/2010) (Brazil 2009). The legal framework established specific 
targets to reduce GHG emissions in different economic sectors, including energy (Brazil 2009).
Brazil makes a significant use of renewable energy, but its share in the energy matrix has been 
decreasing. Hydroelectricity production was 428,333 GWh in 2011, 415,342 GWh in 2012 and 
390,992 GWh in 2013; moreover, the use of natural gas, oil and coal in electricity production 
has been increasing – between 2009 and 2013, they rose, respectively, 417.57%, 73.60% and 
172.62% (ANEEL 2014). There are two main reasons for this. First, the construction of new 
hydropower plants have been delayed, due to both lack of financial resources and recurrent 
Wandering decarbonization: the BRIC countries as conservative climate powers
Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 59(1): e001, 2016 Viola; Basso  
12
controversies over their environmental and social impacts. Second, new hydropower plans employ 
run-of-the-river technology, which allegedly reduce the impacts over local natural ecosystems, but 
add to global ones by requiring a backup system to keep electricity generated amounts constant 
(Viola and Basso 2014). Fossil fuel thermal power plants have been chosen as both backup 
systems for run-of-the-river hydropower plants, thus their increasing share in the energy matrix.
In 2002, the Brazilian federal government enacted the Alternative Energy Sources Incentive 
Program (in Portuguese, PROINFA). According to this program, either small hydropower, 
wind or biomass plants should produce 10% of Brazilian electricity by 2020. Between 2004 
and 2011, small hydropower plants sold around 1,800MW in electricity auctions; wind sold 
5,399.50MW, and biomass sold 2,500MW (Nogueira and Costa 2012). Solar energy was not 
included among the renewable sources in PROINFA due to price concerns. In 2014, solar 
photovoltaic sold 1,048MW (installed capacity) in electricity auction, and in August 2015, 
1,043 MW (installed capacity). Poor maintenance of the transmission lines and the absence of 
a widely established smart grid hinder consistent expansion of renewable electricity in Brazil.
Another setback for renewables took place in the fuel sector. Until 2006, the domestic 
prices of oil/derivatives followed international ones; after that, however, due to the discovery 
of the deep offshore reserves – and the illusion that Brazil would rapidly become a great 
producer and exporter of oil – the federal government misleadingly subsidized oil prices 
to maintain economic growth rates high, changing the relative prices gasoline/ethanol and 
undermining the competitiveness of the latter. After the economic crisis that followed the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, tax exemptions to the automobile industry were included in the 
package of countercyclical measures to maintain economic growth. These exemptions led to 
increase in car ownership and a dramatic increase in fuel demand, while ethanol prices were still 
not competitive. These heterodox policies might have enhanced short-term economic growth, 
however increased long-term macroeconomic imbalance and penalized both Petrobras – having 
faced several important losses – and the ethanol production chain.
Despite using more renewable energy than the world average, Brazil is not an energy efficient 
country. From 1984 to 2004, the amount of energy effectively employed in final use (in relation 
to total energy input) shifted from 46.9% to a mere 57.8% (EPE 2013, 193); the performance 
of many sectors were even poorer – e.g. from 31.4% to 37.5% in transports (EPE 2013, 193); 
comparing to the US, Brazilian truckload freights consume 85% more fuel (MME 2011). There 
is a regulatory framework and mandatory programs for energy efficiency: the National Electrical 
Energy Conservation Program (in Portuguese, PROCEL) aims at reducing the consumption 
of electricity; the National Program of Rational Use of Oil and Natural Gas Byproducts (in 
Portuguese, CONPET) targets the use of oil and derivatives; the Brazilian Labeling Program (in 
Portuguese, PBE) classifies household appliances, devices and light utility vehicles according to 
their energy use; law No. 9991/2000 mandates electricity companies to a minimum investment 
in energy efficiency R&D. Yet, real gains have been small. The only substantial exception was 
the rapid and efficient response to electricity scarcity during the 2001 supply crisis: the National 
Policy for Conservation and Rational Use of Energy (Law No. 10295/2001) was enacted; labeling 
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became much more stringent; industries were forced to increase energy efficiency so not to face 
economic losses. In the following years, though, energy waste resumed its previous high levels.
Brazilian transport system is also highly inefficient. The country’s freight is mostly carried 
in roads by trucks fueled with diesel, and there is only 8-10%7 of biodiesel in the diesel mix. 
Brazilian automotive industry accepts only vague energy efficiency labeling, and European and 
US companies lobby against stricter energy efficiency labeling in Brazil.8 Most consumers do 
not understand the concept of energy efficiency, and still buy cars according to short-term costs 
only. Even the flex-fuel technology was not developed due to pure environmental concerns, but 
as a means to create a market for boosted ethanol production. Considering that energy access is 
no longer a major issue in the country – electricity is available to 100% of urban and 97% of 
rural Brazilian population; LPG for cooking, to 94% (IEA 2014f ) –, recent electricity supply 
crises9 and the increase of fossil fuels in the matrix, which harm the health and the environment, 
better standards for energy efficiency should be a priority in the country.
Brazil is experiencing an economic crisis which, in the short term, is even deeper than the 
Russian’s. The GDP stagnated in 2014, contracted 4% in 2015, it is expected to contract 4% 
in 2016 and 1% in 2017. Consequently, between 2014 and 2017, Brazilian per capita income 
is going to shrink more than 10%. Due to current crises – economic and political –, concerns 
over climate change are being marginalized in Brazil.
Trajectories and commitments in the climate regime
According to the forces that prevail in influencing countries’ positions in the global carbon 
cycle and their mindset regarding climate change, standings in the climate regime can be classified 
as reformist or conservative (Viola et al. 2012). When a country is mostly in favor of measures 
which really push climate change mitigation, thus reforming the current regime, it will be classified 
as reformist; when it opposes such measures it will be classified as conservative. Granted that this 
is a broad classification, which takes into account the prevailing standings of a country regarding 
climate change. Countries are complex entities composed mainly of governments, businesses, 
scientific communities and civil society, which might not share the prevailing standings.
China has been a conservative country in the climate regime, but lately has moved to a 
moderate conservative position. It is not part of the Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol, and has 
headed the G77+China coalition, which defends a radical interpretation of the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility, and a heavy commitment of developed countries to 
engage in reducing emissions first. At COP 15, China pledged to reduce the carbon intensity 
7 Law 11.097/2005 and ANP Resolution 15/2006 and 14/2012.
8 Japanese and Korean companies are exceptions to this rule.
9  In February 2014, due to an unusually hotter summer and the increased use of cooling devices, there were several cuts in electricity 
supply due to the incapacity of the system to answer to the demand; given that the summer was also unusually dry and Brazil relies on 
summer rains to refill UHEs reservoirs, either electricity will be rationed or fossil fuel thermal power plants will be further employed 
over the winter.
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of its GDP by 40-45% until 2020, to raise the level of non-fossil fuels in primary energy 
consumption to 15% until 2020, and to increase forest coverage by 40 million hectares, raising 
forest stock by 1.3 billion cubic meters, all pledges having 2005 as baseline (UN 2010b). In 
November 2014, in a bilateral agreement with the United States, China stated its intention 
to peak CO2 emissions at least until 2030 and to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in 
primary energy consumption to around 20% at least until the same year. In its Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), China pledged, as general commitments: to peak 
its emissions at least by 2030 and to reduce carbon intensity of its GDP by 60-65%; to increase 
the share of non fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20%; and to increase 
the forest stock volume by around 4.5 billion cubic meters, all by 2030 having 2005 numbers 
as baseline (UN 2015). The pledge was classified generally as medium, except for the carbon 
intensity target, considered weak (Climate Action Tracker 2015). The Chinese INDC is not 
ambitious. In 2015, the country had 17% of the world population and around 28% of global 
carbon emissions, and it is possible that the latter will amount to a third of global emissions 
by 2030, thus China is the most important player in the global decarbonization dynamics. 
A more ambitious Chinese pledge is a necessary condition for a consistent international advance 
on climate change. On a positive note, the Chinese pledge is very credible because China has 
shown capacity of implementing the Copenhagen commitment.
Russia is an extremely conservative player in the climate regime. Its engagement in the 
climate regime is very peculiar. During the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, its goal was 
to maximize the sales of carbon credits (“hot air”)10 to other developed countries. When the 
Kyoto Protocol was ratified and the United States withdrew, Russia understood that the market 
for “hot air” would be smaller; it ratified the Kyoto Protocol in exchange for its acceptance 
as a member of the World Trade Organization. Russia is, among the four countries object 
of the paper, the only in the Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol. Its emissions decreased around 
13% between 1990 and 2012, mostly due to reduced economic activity, not for its efforts to 
decarbonize its economy. At COP 15, Russia pledged a 15-25% reduction in emissions compared 
to 1990 levels, the range depending on (i) “appropriate accounting of the potential of Russia’s 
forestry in frame of contribution in meeting the obligations of the anthropogenic emissions 
reduction” and (ii) “undertaking by all major emitters the legally binding obligations to reduce 
anthropogenic GHG emissions” (UN 2010a). In its INDC, Russia pledged to reduce 25-30% 
of its emissions between 2020 and 2030, compared to 1990 levels, “subject to the maximum 
possible account of absorbing capacity of forests” (UN 2015). The latter pledge was classified as 
inadequate, not in line with a fair approach to reach global average temperature increase within 
2oC (Climate Action Tracker 2015). Considering the gap between Russia’s pledges and their 
implementation, the country’s INDC can be considered the least ambitious and least credible 
(of being implemented) among G20 countries, except maybe Saudi Arabia.
10  The term hot air refers to carbon credits that are a result not of efforts to increase decarbonization, but of emissions that were no 
longer in place due to reduced economic activity. They are artificial, meaning that no effort was undertaken to enhance a country's 
performance: it might still be a very carbon intensive economy – true in the case of Russia.
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India pushes conservative standings in the climate regime, and is one of the most active 
defenders of the common but differentiated responsibilities and historical responsibilities 
discourse. At COP 15, India pledged to reduce CO2 emissions per unit of GDP between 
20-25% by 2020, compared to the 2005 levels, and it would, in order to achieve the target: 
(i) increase fossil fuel standards by 2011; (ii) adopt building energy codes by 2012; (iii) increase 
forest cover to sequester an amount equivalent to 10% of its annual carbon emissions; and 
(iv) increase electricity from wind, solar and small hydropower from 8 to 20% by 2020 (UN 
2010b). India resists the idea of compulsory reductions of emissions trajectory for developing 
countries, interpreting the doctrine of common but differentiated responsibilities almost as if 
nothing is common and everything is differentiated. In its INDC, India pledged (i) to reduce 
the emissions intensity of its GDP by 33 to 35% by 2030 from 2005 level, (ii) to achieve about 
40% cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-fossil fuel based energy resources by 
2030 – “with the help of transfer of technology and low cost international finance including 
from Green Climate Fund (GCF)” –, and (iii)  to create an additional carbon sink of 2.5 to 
3 billion tons of CO2 equivalent through additional forest and tree cover by 2030 (UN 2015). 
The Climate Action Tracker (2015) classified the pledge as medium because it employs a 
methodology very sensitive to per capita emissions – if absolute amounts were the baseline, 
the pledge would have been considered weak. India’s Paris pledge, however, is not ambitious.
Brazilian position in the climate regime has been wavering: conservative until 2009, moderate 
conservative between 2009 and 2010, conservative between 2011 and 2014, and moderate 
conservative in 2015. At COP 15, Brazil pledged to reduce its emissions growth, compared to 
business as usual scenarios, by 36-39% until 2020, and to cut 80% of deforestation by 2020, 
when taken as baseline the year of 2005 (UN 2010b) – in 2005, deforestation peaked in Brazil. 
In its INDC, Brazil pledged to reduce emissions by 37% until 2025 and 43% until 2030, 
compared to its 2005 levels (UN 2015). It is an important advance, as, for the first time, Brazil 
has presented an absolute GHG reduction target compared to a base year (instead of business 
as usual scenarios). Yet, although targets for the energy sector are only indicative, they are not 
ambitious. Increasing the share of sustainable biofuels to approximately 18% by 2030 is not 
challenging when bioenergy already answered for 17.6% in the transport sector in 2014 (EPE 
2015a, 25). Achieving 45% of renewables in the energy mix by 2030 is also not challenging, 
as their share average 43.64% between 2004 and 2014 and average 45.32% between 2004 and 
2009 (EPE 2015b, 24), having decreased due to policy issues reported in a previous section. 
Increasing renewable energy sources other than hydro in the total energy mix between 28% and 
33% by 2030 when they already accounted for 27.9% in 2014 (EPE 2015a, 20; EPE 2015b, 24) 
is also conservative. Considering the trajectory of recent Brazilian energy policy, it seems that 
the targets for the energy sector were kept unambitious in order to allow an increase of fossil 
fuel use in the near future. Brazilian pledge was classified as medium: emissions will actually 
increase compared to the 2005 levels and the country is very close to reaching the target just 
by maintaining current policies (Climate Action Tracker 2015). Therefore, due to the reasons 
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explained above, the Brazilian INDC is not ambitious. In addition, the current deep governance 
crisis in Brazil and the weak implementation of the Climate Law affects the credibility of the 
pledge’s implementation.
Table 3: Commitments in the climate regime
COP 15 – Copenhagen COP 21 – Paris
China
By 2020 (baseline = 2005): (i) to reduce the carbon 
intensity of its GDP by 40-45%; (ii) to raise the level 
of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to 
15%; (iii) to increase forest coverage by 40 million 
hectares, raising forest stock by 1.3 billion cubic meters.
By 2030 (baseline = 2005): (i) to peak emissions; (ii) to 
reduce carbon intensity of its GDP by 60-65%; (iii) to 
increase the share of non fossil fuels in primary energy 
consumption to around 20%; (iv) to increase the forest 
stock volume by around 4.5 billion cubic meters.
Russia
By 2020 (baseline = 1990): to reduce 15-25% of its 
emissions, the range depending on (i) “appropriate 
accounting of the potential of Russia’s forestry in 
frame of contribution in meeting the obligations of the 
anthropogenic emissions reduction” and (ii) “undertaking 
by all major emitters the legally binding obligations to 
reduce anthropogenic GHG emissions”.
Between 2020 and 2030 (baseline = 1990): to reduce 
25-30% of its emissions, “subject to the maximum 
possible account of absorbing capacity of forests”.
India
By 2020 (baseline = 2005): to reduce CO2 emissions 
per unit of GDP between 20-25%. In order to achieve 
the target: (i) increase fossil fuel standards by 2011; 
(ii) adopt building energy codes by 2012; (iii) increase 
forest cover to sequester an amount equivalent to 
10% of its annual carbon emissions; and (iv) increase 
electricity from wind, solar and small hydropower from 
8 to 20%.
By 2030 (baseline = 2005): (i) to reduce the emissions 
intensity of its GDP by 33 to 35%; (ii) to achieve about 
40% cumulative electric power installed capacity from 
non-fossil fuel based energy resources, "with the help 
of transfer of technology and low cost international 
finance including from Green Climate Fund (GCF)"; 
and (iii)  to create an additional carbon sink of 2.5 to 
3 billion tons of CO2 equivalent through additional 
forest and tree cover.
Brazil
By 2020: (i) to reduce its emissions growth by 36-39%, 
baseline = business as usual scenarios; and (ii) to cut 
80% of deforestation, baseline = 2005.
By 2025-2030 (baseline = 2005): to reduce emissions 
by 37-43% (respectively); (i) increasing the share of 
sustainable biofuels to approximately 18%; (ii) achieving 
45% of renewables in the energy mix; expanding wind, 
solar and biomass to 28-33% of the matrix and 23% of 
the electricity production; increasing energy efficiency 
in electricity by 10%; (iii) zero illegal deforestation; 
(iv) restoring 15 million hectares of pastureland and 
enhancing 5 million hectares of integrated cropland-
livestock-forestry systems; (v) promoting new standards 
of clean technology and further enhance energy 
efficiency measures and low carbon infrastructure in the 
industrial sector; (vi) promoting efficiency measures in 
the transportation sector, and improving infrastructure 
for transport and public transportation in urban areas.
Source: Author’s own elaboration, based on data from UNFCCC, <http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/items/5265.
php> and <http://unfccc.int/focus/indc_portal/items/8766.php>. Accessed February 5, 2016.
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Conclusion
Global decarbonization is key to mitigate climate change. China, India, Russia and Brazil 
are among the greatest carbon emitters. They are, together with the United States, the European 
Union, Japan and Korea, key climate powers – countries with relevant GHG emissions in total 
global amount, as well as human and technological capacity to implement decarbonization 
(Viola et al. 2012). Action taken – or not taken – by climate powers determine the intensity 
and scale of climate change globally.
The BRIC countries have different GHG emissions profile. Industrial processes are key 
emitting sectors in China, agriculture is central in Brazil and India, and energy is relevant in all 
of them. Due to the centrality of energy use in total global emissions, this article has analyzed 
energy decarbonization efforts in the four countries. It concludes that they have been promoting 
energy decarbonization, but that measures have been dissimilar, taking their rationality and 
scale into account.
In China, energy decarbonization efforts have been pushed by demands to reduce air 
pollution and by investments in low carbon energy technology. Low carbon energy production 
has increased consistently in the last decade, though low carbon sources still occupy a small 
share of the Chinese energy matrix – increase in energy consumption and the exploitation of 
large and cheap coal reserves are the main reasons for it. China has been adopting important 
measures to increase energy efficiency. By looking at the implementation of policies in China 
so far, the country is embracing energy decarbonization. However, its pace is not fast enough 
to stabilize GHG emissions. Given that China is a global GHG powerhouse, this is not good 
news to climate change mitigation: if the country were to be a responsible player in the regime, 
its GHG reduction should be a lot sharper.
Russian emissions decreased due to reduced economic activity, not decarbonization efforts. 
It has enacted policies in support of energy efficiency and low carbon energy, but implementation 
has been weak. The country is still very dependent on the exploitation of fossil fuels, both to 
answer its energy requirements and as a source of income, since it is one of the world’s greatest 
exporters of oil and gas. Russia is one of few countries that would benefit, temporarily, from 
climate change – frozen land would become available for agriculture –, and so government 
does not prioritize the issue. There is no strong evidence of a changed perspective regarding 
decarbonization in Russia.
India is one of the countries most vulnerable to climate change and has hundreds of 
millions of people without access to energy. It has great potential to develop low carbon energy 
– which would contribute to both issues – and to improve energy efficiency. Although policy 
and targets in support of energy decarbonization have been in place, the topic does not seem 
central to the Indian government – in fact, climate change has lost place in recent Indian policy 
planning, unfortunately. And the implementation of energy decarbonization policy has been 
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falling behind. It is no surprise that India remains one of the most conservative powers in the 
climate regime.
In Brazil, deforestation has been the greatest source of GHG emissions, and climate policy 
has focused on tackling it. Emissions from energy, however, have been increasing, both due 
to decrease of deforestation as well as to the rising of use of fossil fuels. Brazilian potential to 
develop new renewables – wind, solar, biomass – is one of world’s greatest. These sources have 
been expanding timidly; but there are important barriers to their further development, related 
to the political entanglement of energy sectors in the politics, and the lack of consistent and 
large-scale incentives to the development of low carbon technology. The country has been mostly 
conservative in the climate regime, occasionally defending more moderate positions. However, 
due to its weight in the global carbon cycle, Brazil is lagging behind its potential of becoming 
a reformist power in the regime.
The four countries have been conservative climate players. Their INDCs, for instance, 
should be a lot more ambitious in order to put the world on track of keeping close to 1.5oC 
increase in global average temperature by 2100. They all should present more ambitious standings: 
China and India due to the current weight of their emissions in total global emissions; Russia 
due to its historical contribution to the increase of GHG concentration in the atmosphere; and 
Brazil due to its potential of further decreasing emissions and its alleged climate leadership. 
Their commitment to decarbonization should transcend the multilateral climate regime: further 
involvement with other multilateral fora, such as the International Renewable Energy Agency 
(IRENA) – whose creation was opposed by the four countries; yet later, China, India and 
Russia became members – and with decarbonization measures promoted by G20. These would 
be important signs of change in perspective regarding the issue.
The conservative influence of the four BRIC countries in the climate regime has helped 
preventing more reformist initiatives, promoted firstly by the European Union and Japan, and 
lately by the European Union alone, to flourish. The four are, of course, not alone in their 
standings: the United States has sided with them. As explored in this article, their arguments 
to justify the conservative standings are different, but, in common, they understand climate 
change as a traditional geopolitical issue, in which national interest is defined and framed by 
each state on its own. This is an outdated position: as a common good issue, climate change 
can only be tackled by increasing global governance; effectiveness of measures is connected 
to a new interpretation of sovereignty, in which national interest is related, not opposed, to 
this pursued common good. Responsibility to tackle climate change is directly correlated with 
responsibility to cause it: the four BRIC countries, whose emissions have been rising sharply 
since 1992, are, thus, key players. We can only hope that they understand it and present more 
reformist standings in the near future, for the global common good.
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